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Military Entrepreneurs:
Patterns in Latin America
Kristina Mani
ABSTRACT
Despite the recent shift to democratic regimes and market-based
economies, in many Latin American countries the military retains
important economic roles as owner, manager, and stakeholder in
economic enterprises. Such military entrepreneurship poses a challenge to the development of democratic civil-military relations and,
by extension, to the development of liberal democracy in the
region. While scholars have noted this situation with concern, they
have given little attention to distinguishing the different types of
military entrepreneurship, which reflect distinct historical patterns
and implications. This article identifies two major types of military
entrepreneurs in Latin America: industrializers, determined to build
national defense capabilities and compete for international prestige;
and nation builders, seeking to promote economic development
that can foster social development and cohesion. Case studies of
Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, and Ecuador demonstrate important differences between these two types in their origins, paths, and political
consequences.

M

ilitaries in Latin America are not strangers to economic enterprise.
In many countries, the military has long managed firms in the
national defense industry, but its economic reach is often much broader.
In Argentina and Brazil, the military pioneered the development of
national oil and steel companies. In Ecuador, it runs and profits from its
own business enterprises, many of which are not related to the defense
sector. In Cuba, it manages state-owned enterprises in key economic
sectors like tourism and agriculture, while in Honduras it is called in as
the apparent manager of last resort to run public companies or build
national infrastructure. In El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and
Nicaragua, armed forces pension funds are key stakeholders in enterprises ranging from construction to finance. In only a handful of cases
have militaries been divested of substantial economic holdings, notably
in Argentina in the 1990s.
In Latin America during the long half-century between the 1930s
and 1980s, military rule was common, and military entrepreneurship—
essentially the military’s ownership, management, or stakeholding of
economic enterprises—frequently accompanied it. The transitions of the
1980s to electoral democracy and the market-based economy returned
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civilians to power and gradually diminished the political prerogatives
the armed forces had long held. In the overwhelming majority of the
region’s countries, defense ministries are now managed by civilians,
national military budgets rank among the lowest in the world, the armed
forces train for participation in U.N. peacekeeping missions, and trials
of military officers for past human rights violations have resurged even
in countries where amnesties had sealed the doors on the past.
Yet despite the advances that have removed Latin American militaries from positions of overt political power, in many countries the
armed forces have retained economic interests as owners, managers,
and stakeholders in commercial, industrial, and financial enterprises.
Economic interests can empower the military in ways that undermine
the achievement of democratic civilian control.1 In particular, they can
enable the armed forces to secure revenue independent of government
allocation, to gain favorable access to state resources, and to maintain a
tradition of nondefense roles that make the military a first-choice
provider in lieu of civilian personnel. Such distortions constitute important challenges in civil-military relations and, by extension, an important
challenge to strengthening and deepening democracy in the region.
Concern over the consequences of military economic activities has
grown in recent years, particularly in the wake of the boom in world
markets during the decade 2000–2010 for commodities from whose
export the militaries in a number of Latin American countries benefit
(Centeno 2007; Donadio 2007). Still, little effort has been made to distinguish different types of military entrepreneurship, along with their
historical roots and contemporary implications. Latin American militaries
have undertaken a variety of economic activities in a range of contexts,
from Central America and the Caribbean to Brazil and the Southern
Cone, in economies large and small, semi-industrialized and agriculturebased, democratic-representative, military-authoritarian, and communist-totalitarian. How can we sort them out? This is a task scholars need
to undertake in order to advance the discussion of contemporary policy
responses.
This article begins such a process by identifying two types of military entrepreneurs in the region: industrializers, who are determined to
lessen dependence on foreign investment and build a national infrastructure for arms production; and nation builders, who seek to promote
social development to advance economic redistribution and social cohesion. This article traces the development of industrializer militaries in
Argentina and Brazil back to their origins in the interwar period, and the
development of nation builder militaries in Cuba and Ecuador to the
tumultuous last decades of the Cold War. To explain these developments, this study offers a historical-institutionalist argument that hinges
on three factors: the opening of a critical economic juncture, which trig-
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gers an examination of national economic priorities in the armed forces;
the military’s strategic priorities, which condition the kind of entrepreneurship it is likely to pursue; and the coalitional opportunities the military encounters with state or private sector actors, which affect the
political viability of the military’s economic undertakings.
Part of the goal of distinguishing among different types of military
entrepreneurs is to specify more clearly their implications for contemporary civil-military relations. Thus, for instance, contemporary nation
builders (like those of Bolivia, Cuba, and Ecuador) can gain important
popular legitimacy through their economically generated social support
activities, with the implication that this kind of legitimation enhances the
military’s de facto autonomy from civilian control.
The article continues by specifying the concept of military entrepreneurship, then explains how military entrepreneurship challenges
the development of democratic civilian control of the armed forces. It
provides a critical account of scholarship on the Latin American military’s economic activities. It then lays out a theoretical explanation for
the rise of military industrializers and nation builders, followed by narrative accounts of the major cases along these paths. In conclusion, it
considers the situation of contemporary military industrializers and
nation builders and the implications for achieving democratic civilian
control of the military.

CONCEPTUALIZING MILITARY ENTREPRENEURSHIP
The term military entrepreneurship is sometimes used loosely to
describe the many sorts of profitmaking in which armed actors might
engage; for instance, the activities of private security firms that have
multiplied in the post–Cold War period. However, to be useful for the
purpose of theory building and analytical comparisons, the concept
should be defined quite literally and narrowly. A fruitful conceptualization of military entrepreneurship would capture the institutional nature
of the military and the innovation that is commonly associated with
entrepreneurship.
As scholars since Samuel Huntington’s Soldier and the State (1957)
have emphasized, modern militaries are state-based institutional actors
with collective interests and professional standards. Their interests are
fundamentally corporate rather than individual. And as Joseph Schumpeter and other economists have suggested, entrepreneurship involves
developing new means of production, of allocating resources in creative
new ways; for instance, opening a new market, securing a new source
of materials or goods, or reorganizing a sector of the economy (Schumpeter 1983, 66). The task that follows is to explain why militaries
become entrepreneurial and how this matters.
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Theorists of civil-military relations and of international relations
have come closest to exploring these puzzles. In the area of civil-military relations, studies of conditions in the developing world have paid
the most attention to what we might call “commercial preserve” military
entrepreneurship. The core claim from this literature is that the armed
forces pursue economic ventures to secure resources for institutional
benefit (Brömmelhörster and Paes 2004, 13). Yet the kinds of enterprises
the military pursues, the assets it acquires, and the explicit political legitimation it enjoys may vary substantially. For instance, in the twentieth
century, militaries were involved in developing corporations, welfare
foundations, and even unit-level commercial operations to generate
resources that accrued to them. In several outstanding cases, the military’s commercial assets have ranged into the billions of dollars: the
Turkish military’s pension fund was assessed at $8 billion, and the Pakistani military’s assets at over $5 billion (Gumbel 2008; Harrison 2002).
Political elites frequently signal expectations that militaries should provide revenue for themselves, sometimes explicitly through state leaders,
as in China in the 1980s (Mulvenon 2001). However, the most common
feature of cases like these is that the military’s commercial activities have
often originated as a substitute for the incapacities of the state or private
sector, or as compensation for state budgets that do not fully fund
defense needs (Brömmelhörster and Paes 2004, 13–15).
In contrast, international relations theorists have focused on the
state-level implications of particular kinds of military entrepreneurship.
They have pursued what we might call a “grand strategy” interpretation
of military entrepreneurship, which emphasizes how the military’s
defense procurement needs can promote the development of technology and industry, and therefore the creation of state power. For IR theorists, military entrepreneurship emerges through the doctrines and
activities of modern militaries whose state-based position and strategic
vision allow them to become a sponsor and consumer of new technologies that can foster the development of new sectors of the economy. Such analyses remind us that even huge bureaucracies can promote and manage innovation (Snyder 1984; Smith 1985; Rosen 1991).
They do so to create advantage over adversaries through the “imaginative and competitive manipulation of resources” (Shimshoni 1990–91,
189), and their innovations can have long-term, transformative spillover
effects. For instance, fordism—the practice of standardizing output in
order to increase productivity—had its roots in the nineteenth-century
military arms industry, when managerial structures employed in the U.S.
Army were later adopted into the private sector (Smith 1985, 11).
Although successful innovations from military activities may not always
result or even be intended, the IR literature points usefully to the importance of exploring this angle.
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How, then, might we define military entrepreneurship in a way that
is narrow enough to be conceptually clear yet comprehensive enough
to enable comparison among a range of real world examples? This study
defines military entrepreneurship as the innovative creation of resources
and new means of production by commissioned military officers acting
in an institutional capacity as formal owners, managers, and stakeholders of enterprises that generate financial resources or goods directly
benefiting the military. This definition captures the idea that military
entrepreneurship is a product of the military as institution, which is
likely to have significant implications for its durability. For instance, by
acting in an institutional rather than individual capacity, military entrepreneurs are operating in ways that are generally legal and politically
sanctioned—an important distinction that sets this apart from illicit activities actors might conceivably undertake.2
The institutional and legal aspects of the military’s economic activities are important for providing the legitimation that enables the military
to more effectively lay claim to its holdings. On the other hand, by
emphasizing innovative capacity, this definition excludes from consideration some of the more common practices militaries occasionally
engage in purely for profit. For instance, the security for hire provision
of service that militaries can take up only constitutes entrepreneurship
if it involves the creation of new goods or markets (e.g., a market for
military-trained security forces).

WHY MILITARY ENTREPRENEURSHIP MATTERS
Military entrepreneurship is a controversial issue in democratic civilian control of the armed forces and a potential hindrance to the
empowerment of the state and society—aspects crucial to the development of an effective consolidated democracy (Linz and Stepan
1996). Military entrepreneurship is potentially detrimental in at least
three ways.
First, the military’s economic activities can allow it to secure significant sources of revenue independent of government allocation. This
reduces the authority of elected officials to oversee the military through
the most basic kind of control a government can exert—the power of
the purse (Hendrickson and Ball 2002; Brömmelhörster and Paes 2004,
11–13). As a result, elected officials may not be able to assess accurately
either the real resources or the real needs for the defense budget. In
Ecuador, for instance, where the military has owned more than a dozen
corporations since the 1970s, the corporate profits are added into the
defense budget with minimal transparency and no legislative review
(García Gallegos 2004). In Indonesia, even following an independent
audit as military divestiture was underway, official assessments of the
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military’s own economic productivity varied widely, from 25 percent to
50 percent of budget (Human Rights Watch 2006).
In many countries, the military’s economic role gives it favorable
access to state resources through state contracts, guarantees of its assets,
and fixed rents. These advantages can perpetuate patronage practices
that long characterized authoritarian Latin America and can maintain for
the armed forces a privileged position in the state (Cruz and Diamint
1998). For example, through its pension fund, the Honduran military
bought into indebted state holdings at bargain prices when they were
“privatized” in the early 1990s. Among them is Incehsa, the country’s
largest cement producer, which regularly beats out competitors for
public works projects. Moreover, the military’s position as an institution
with privileged ties to the state and its leaders effectively gives it an
incentive to interfere in politics when its resources are at stake. The
Ecuadorian military’s stewardship of the national oil industry originated
under military rule in the 1970s, yet even under subsequent civilian rule,
it could claim an annual royalty from the export profits of the state oil
company, Petroecuador, until its mandate expired in 1999. The royalty’s
expiration is considered one of the reasons for the coup that took President Jamil Mahuad from power that same year. Under his civilian successor, the military was able to secure $150 million in compensation for
the loss of the royalty (García Gallegos 2004, 39–40).
The military’s economic activities constitute an important departure
from its essential task of providing for national defense. They perpetuate
a long tradition in which the region’s armed forces have carried out multiple roles as social and political “providers” to the nation when other
state and private sector actors should have filled the gaps. As a result,
militaries are often the first-choice responders for political elites who
want their policies carried out quickly and effectively—and who want to
curry favor with their militaries as partners in national development. In
Bolivia, the military fulfills President Evo Morales’s charge to “serve the
people” as the regular distributors of bonus monies to school-aged children and the elderly—two hundred million dollars annually to the latter
alone (Mercosur Noticias 2007). In Ecuador, President Rafael Correa
turned over the management of Petroecuador to the navy as a way to
halt the corruption that had plagued the firm under civilian management.
Yet excessive involvement in such nondefense activities can have
costly consequences. The Ecuadorian military’s defeat in the 1981 border
conflict with Peru led it to realize that excessive involvement in administering the state was detrimental to its professional development and
defense capabilities. But instead of shifting its focus to these areas, the
military expanded its social activities in more targeted ways, developing
agricultural production in Amazon communities as a way to colonize the
territories and peoples barely reached by the state (Ortiz 2006, 80).
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Of course, each of these concerns is a variable factor. It is entirely
plausible, for instance, that military economic activities can be transparent, accountable, and efficient, and that they do not impinge on the
military’s professional capabilities. The track record, however, tends to
reinforce perverse dynamics. In many cases, these challenges warrant
concerted reforms initiated by both elites and civil society actors.

SURVEYING

THE

SCHOLARSHIP

During the last two decades, scholarship on the military in Latin America
has focused on the development of civilian control of the armed forces in
democracy. With much of this scholarship in the hands of political scientists, attention has generally been on how new military roles and the
design of defense institutions affect the military’s ability to influence politics and contest civilian authority (Goodman 1996; Norden 1996; Fitch
1998; Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin 2000; Pion-Berlin 2009). Less attention
has gone to studying the military’s economic roles systematically.3
In earlier decades, scholars from a range of disciplines frequently
drew attention to the military’s involvement in the economy. The 1960s
brought a first wave of studies, often by economic historians and historically minded economists, who identified the military as a key (and
often admirable) protagonist in economic development and industrialization (Leff 1968; Baer 1969; Wirth 1970; Solberg 1979). In the 1970s
and 1980s, a second wave of studies emphasized structural factors tying
the military to the development of industry and the defense sector.
While studies of defense industrial production in the developing world
often highlighted the military’s protagonism as a structural consequence
of international stratification (Neuman 1984; Katz 1984; Brzoska and
Ohlson 1986), scholars of Latin American militaries proper interpreted
military entrepreneurship more critically, linking it to the development
of international capitalism or to a militarization of the state and society
that produced the era’s bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes (Morales
Domínguez 1973; Varas 1985; Rouquié 1987).
As military rule began to wind down, scholars remained concerned
that the economic roles the military had constructed for itself would be
difficult to dislodge and would constitute one of several ways the military could diversify itself in order to retain institutional autonomy under
new democratic regimes (Stepan 1988; Varas 1989). The inefficiencies of
state-owned enterprises under military stewardship frequently drew
attention (Wionczek 1985; Dagnino 1988; López 1988), though by the
mid-1990s, scholars of civil-military relations were taking stock of new
forms of ownership that militaries were developing thorough pension
fund holdings in nondefense sectors like banking and construction
(Goodman 1996; Rial 1996; Brenes and Casas 1998).
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By the end of the decade, scholars were asserting that contemporary forms of military entrepreneurship were unequivocally detrimental
to the establishment of democratic civilian control of the military (Cruz
and Diamint 1998). In recent years, other policy-oriented accounts have
developed a similar critique—that entrepreneurship is one of the ways
through which militaries have reinvented themselves as significant players in a new political-economic security environment, and that the lack
of civilian interest in defense issues leaves many of today’s militaries in
the position of being well resourced but poorly guided by political and
civil society (Centeno 2007; Donadio 2007).
In consequence, virtually all such studies since the 1990s have
focused on the implications of military entrepreneurship and the need
for remedies to curtail it. Yet while policy implications are surely a vital
area for analysis, it seems difficult to assess them effectively without first
sorting among the wide-ranging economic activities the region’s armed
forces have engaged in over many decades. Owning banks and supermarkets is not the same as lobbying for and managing Brazil’s Volta
Redona steel mill. Indeed, consideration of strategic rationales for “military production” in Latin America still deserves more serious attention
(Acuña and Smith 1995, 122). Moreover, relatively few comparative
studies of military economic activities exist, particularly ones that are
detailed and historically informed.4 In short, we need studies that recognize and analyze different kinds of military entrepreneurship—specifying factors that motivate it, shape its evolution, and sustain it. The
remainder of the article works toward this end.

EXPLAINING TWO TYPES
ENTREPRENEURSHIP

OF

MILITARY

An important general factor that primed the military in Latin America
toward entrepreneurship was its capacity in regard to the state. In much
of Latin America, the armed forces developed ahead of state institutions.
In the period 1870–1940, professionalization set the military apart from
other components of the state. European military missions accelerated
the process in which Latin American forces emulated the organization
and doctrines of the world’s most advanced forces (Nunn 1983;
Resende-Santos 2007).
In practical terms, this evolution made Latin American militaries not
only defenders of the nation but also agents of the state- and nationbuilding process—citizenmakers through obligatory military service,
conquerors of uncontrolled territory, surveyors and explorers for states
that were often unable to tax and administer their domains as their
European antecedents had (Centeno 2002; Rouquié 1987). In ideological terms, it led militaries across the region to see themselves as the
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essential component of the state, a self-view that paradoxically became
intertwined with a corporate identity that set the military apart from
other state organizations and from society as a whole (Varas 1985). As
a result, by the early twentieth century, the military’s protagonism in the
economy as much as in politics was primed, though not assured.
Of course, there were also notable exceptions to this strong military–weak state norm. By the mid-twentieth century, such exceptions
included countries where civilian elites had built effective states before
strong militaries (Chile, Uruguay) and where social and political conflict,
both low (Costa Rica) and high (Colombia), precluded creation of any
significant national military. Among these, not even in Chile did the military become entrepreneurial in any meaningful way. For instance,
during his first term, Chile’s only popularly elected military president,
Carlos Ibáñez (1927–31), created the Chilean air force and placed the
country’s first airline, LAN-Chile, under its management, but otherwise
the military stayed out of politics and the economy. Even during the military dictatorship inaugurated in 1973, General Augusto Pinochet turned
to civilians to transform the economy. Although he expanded state
resources for production at the state-owned, military-run defense firms
that had been established earlier (FAMAE, ASNAR, ENAER), the expansion was propelled not by long-term planning but by the shock of the
U.S. arms embargo of 1977 (Acuña and Smith 1995, 136).
What, then, led to the development of military entrepreneurship in
numerous significant cases and in different forms? This study proposes
that a critical economic juncture, the military’s strategic priorities, and its
coalitional opportunities were the main contingent conditions involved.
Military entrepreneurship generally emerged following a critical economic juncture that called into question existing national economic priorities, spurred new thinking, and created openings for a broader array
of actors to take economic initiatives. A critical juncture provides the initial structuring condition or “opening” that defines priorities among otherwise contingent choices; the result sets actors on a new path, creating
institutions that endure over time and are generally difficult to undo or
steer away from (Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Collier and Collier 1991). In
Latin America, such openings followed global events like the Great
Depression, which introduced decades of statist capitalist policies of
import substitution industrialization, or occurred at national junctures,
such as a revolutionary regime change.
Because of its historical role as a protagonist in the state, the military often stood out as an actor suited to implement new national initiatives in this historical juncture. Yet not all militaries were similarly
motivated to fill such a role. Where the armed forces became entrepreneurial, a strong set of military strategic priorities at the critical juncture
was the key indicator of the kinds of economic activities the military
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would champion. Militaries whose strategic priority at the juncture was
the acquisition of armaments tended to become industrializers, embarking on a path to promote industrialization that could provide a domestic base for arms production. Military industrializers emerged primarily
in states where militaries maintained a strong geopolitical orientation
(and often a history of rivalry with neighbors) and prioritized the acquisition of armaments that could enable them to compete militarily with
their neighbors. We could label this crudely as a strategic prioritization
of “guns over butter”—significant in Latin America not because armed
forces sought armaments, but because they recognized a dangerous
dependence on foreign powers for arms and industrial inputs and
sought to overcome it.
In contrast, militaries whose strategic priority at the critical juncture
was social development tended to become nation builders, creating economic enterprises intended to advance economic redistribution and
social cohesion. In the Latin American context, such military nation
builders and their strategic prioritization of “butter over guns” have been
rare, yet they emerged during the Cold War, particularly in the left-oriented militaries that took power in the Andes in the 1960s and 1970s
and in the revolutionary regimes of Cuba and Nicaragua (where “guns”
often could be sourced through new channels, such as the Soviet Union,
allowing “butter” to be a realistic priority).
Still, a structural opening and motivating strategic beliefs were insufficient on their own to initiate military entrepreneurship of any substance. Political allies were also necessary. Thus the coalitional opportunities for the military to ally on an economic project—for instance,
with other actors from the state and private sector—substantially shaped
the political viability of their endeavors. Militaries that could operate
with support from civilian officials, bureaucrats, or private sector leaders were able to take up economic activities with greater survivability
than those that did not because they had greater resources, crucial innovative capacity, and political backing to rely on. Still, the maintenance
of such partnerships was not guaranteed; they would require the continued compatibility of interests among partners in the coalition.
These factors together illuminate a process of institution building in
which a major catalytic event sets in motion powerful motivating ideas
and political alliances that produce military entrepreneurship. They suggest a typology of entrepreneurship that varies in two dimensions: the
military’s strategic prioritization of either national defense or social
development, determining the kind of economic activities it undertook;
and the scope of the coalitional support the military could garner for
these endeavors, determining its ability to keep them politically viable
over the long term. Table 1 brings these two dimensions together to
identify four distinctive forms of military entrepreneurship.
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Table 1. Types of Military Entrepreneurship in Latin America
Coalitional
Opportunities

Military Strategic Priority
________________________________________________
National Defense
Social Development

Broad

Industrializers with
strong political viability

Nation builders with strong
political viability

Brazil 1937–90

Cuba 1989–

Industrializers with
tenuous political viability

Nation builders with tenuous
political viability

Argentina 1941–90

Ecuador 1972–

Narrow

CASES

OF INDUSTRIALIZERS AND

NATION BUILDERS

Four major cases of military entrepreneurship closely approximate the
ideal types in table 1. Argentina and Brazil are historical cases in which
military industrializers concerned with national defense capabilities created a defense-industrial complex on behalf of the state in the era
between the Great Depression of the 1930s and the installation of the
liberalizing Washington Consensus in the 1990s. Cuba and Ecuador are
key contemporary cases in which military nation builders seeking to
achieve greater social equality and political stability came to control vital
sectors of the economy as a result of dramatic shifts in opportunities
(the oil boom of the 1970s in Ecuador) or sudden duress (the end of
Cold War patronage in 1990s Cuba). Among the four cases, only the militaries in Brazil and Cuba were able to rely on a breadth of coalitional
support that could enhance their endeavors with additional resources,
innovative capacity, and political support, making their projects more
durable—and therefore more politically viable—over the long term and
through hard times.
Industrializers in Argentina
Argentina pioneered the industrializer path in Latin America. In a military
already well established as a professional force, World War I raised concern about the need to modernize existing arsenals to keep up with new
defense technologies (Potash 1969, 15). During the 1920s, the middleclass government of Marcelo de Alvear acceded with generous military
budgets and created defense-related industries in aviation and petroleum
at the behest of prominent army officers, who wanted to ensure that
Argentina would not be dependent on foreign industrial imports.5
For instance, General Enrique Mosconi came to run YPF, the
national oil company created in 1922. The import cutoffs during World
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War I and the domineering control that British and U.S. oil trusts exercised (at one point demanding that the army pay ahead for oil deliveries) made Mosconi a tireless advocate of national oil independence. By
the 1930s, he had transformed YPF into the largest enterprise in the
country, one able to do everything from drilling to refining and distribution (Solberg 1982, 381).
Yet overall, Argentine officers were not won over to the need for
industrial development until after the Depression (Potash 1969, 24), in
the context of a renewed exclusion from foreign arms markets. While
the Depression allowed light industries to take off (the product of consumer demand and agro-based wealth from earlier years), Argentina
remained an agro-exporter where heavy industry was largely untried.
For an increasingly politicized and nationalist military with international
power ambitions, this situation became untenable when the United
States denied arms sales to Argentina for its failure to join the Allied
cause while offering generous lend-lease equipment to rival Brazil
(Potash 1969, 101, 169). Thus in 1941, under military rule, the model
Mosconi had established for YPF in the 1920s—involving majority state
ownership, administrative autonomy by the military (to insulate against
politicization), and technocratic military officers as directors in the
administration—was applied to create the state-owned army holding
company Dirección General de Fabricaciones Militares (DGFM).
DGFM’s creation established the principle of military-run industrial
enterprises even before the ascent of Juan Perón, whose nationalistpopulist policies expanded state-led industrial development to unprecedented levels. It was followed by the creation of other state economic
institutions dominated by the military. In 1944, the government created
the country’s first state-owned bank for industrial development, the
Banco de Crédito Industrial, and the army and navy were given permanent seats on the bank’s board. Economic planning would be coordinated through a new secretariat for industry and commerce, headed by
a military officer–engineer drawn from the military’s technical academy,
the Escuela Superior Técnica (Potash 1969, 252). Ironically, by the
1950s, the indigenous industrial development model had become such
a powerful political notion that Perón’s attempts to introduce some foreign investment into YPF became a key factor in his ouster by the military in 1955 (Potash 1969, 287; Solberg 1982, 398).
Argentina’s military-run industries peaked during the last military
regime (1976–83). The army’s DGFM directly employed approximately
14,000 in its 12 military plants and another 16,000 in the associated
enterprises in strategic sectors like steel, chemicals, and mining, in
which it held majority or significant shares; the other services ran 14
plants that included shipyards, aviation and aerospace, transport and
national customs (Latin American Weekly Report 1979; Scheetz 2004). In
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DGFM, the military’s role was overall management and control, including appointing directors and executives for the associated enterprises
(López 1988, 73).
By the late 1970s, a combination of political and ideological factors
reinforced chronic inefficiencies that would bleed state coffers and turn
the military-run sector into a state liability. These included an obsession
with producing a wide range of arms for the military’s own use, rather
than specializing to target export markets and allow more efficient scale
production; inconsistent research and development (R&D) policies that
shifted according to which military services dominated the government;
and the military services’ fiefdom approach to defense-related R&D and
production, which reduced opportunities for innovation and isolated
military industries from competition with a private sector that was fixed
in a supplier role (Millán 1986). As a result, Argentina never came close
to achieving the goal of import substitution in sophisticated defense production to which the military had originally aspired. During the last dictatorship, the military spent an astronomical $10 billion on foreign procurement, while defense exports reached only $217 million (Millán
1986, 36; Solingen 1998, 38).
Such problems were closely related to the military’s inability to
work effectively with private or bureaucratic elites in productive coalitions in the post-Perón era. Divided civilian elites and a factionalized
military typically preferred to exclude rather than include competitors.
Thus, while the military was not without economic allies, it ran its industrial endeavors virtually as a military fiefdom within the state. Unlike the
dynamics in Brazil in the 1960s, when the military actively cultivated private sector firms, in Argentina private sector firms were relegated to supplier status.
Solingen finds that only the ideologically liberal navy was consistent
in supporting private sector innovation for strategic purposes, primarily
in the nuclear sector (Solingen 1998, 38). In addition, in defense procurement, military planners preferred to seek out more sophisticated
and cheaper foreign weapon designs to produce by license and
shunned indigenous design after 1955. Politics generally guided such
decisions. For instance, following the navy-led overthrow of Perón in
1955, the victors virtually stamped out indigenous designs pursued in
the air force’s Córdoba facility because that service had been Perón’s
creation. Thus ended an era in which Argentina had catapulted itself (by
absorbing German wartime engineers) into the ranks of only five countries in the world—and the only one from the developing world—to
produce jet airplanes (Artopoulos 2007). The 1976 dictatorship, moreover, spared its own holdings from the neoliberal stringencies it
required of most other enterprises, further demonstrating the tenuous
affinities it recognized even with regime supporters.
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By the end of the dictatorship in 1983, its disastrous failures were
numerous—human rights abuses, defeat in war, and mismanagement of
the national economy as well as military-run enterprises. There was little
dispute over ending the military enterprise model, though few expected
the defense sector itself to be dismantled entirely.6 Virtually the entire
defense and strategic sector was sold or liquidated, though some agencies were transferred to the provinces or the Ministry of Economics,
including three modest armaments plants under Ministry of Economics
control. Moreover, in the whirlwind neoliberal restructuring in the early
1990s, divestiture took place at firesale prices, netting only $820 million—one-seventh of the total asset book value (Scheetz 2004, 27, 29).
Ultimately, the industry, and the military that ran it almost singlehandedly, lost their champions—done in by their own inefficiencies, the policies of military rule, and a powerful new economic model.

Industrializers in Brazil
In comparison with Argentina, the Brazilian case reveals similarities in
historical triggers and strategic purpose, but differences in coalitional
opportunities. In Brazil, the military’s strategic priorities were defined in
events in the first decades of the twentieth century, which primed
Brazilian military elites to concern over industrial and arms dependence.
At a time when Brazil’s state militias were dominant and a federal army
barely existed, military missions to Europe exposed army officers to
world-class technologies, organization, and cohesive doctrines. At the
same time, World War I demonstrated Brazil’s dependence on industrialized countries and opened discussion in the military, voiced frequently
in journals like A Defesa Nacional, over the need for an indigenous
industrial base (Hilton 1982; McCann 1984). Still, most officers remained
laissez-faire advocates and preferred that Brazil strive for industrial
development without direct military involvement (Hilton 1982, 643–44).
As in Argentina, such views changed in the global depression of the
1930s, which collapsed Brazil’s export markets and brought a major balance of payments crisis that cut crucial imports like oil, industrial raw
materials, and arms. Even more acutely than in Argentina, events of the
1930s in Brazil raised military alarm over the very real absence of
defense capabilities. The 1932 São Paulo rebellion, which federal forces
struggled to put down; the Chaco War of 1932–35, in which foreign
interests stoked conflict among Brazil’s neighbors in the pursuit of
petroleum deposits; and the possibility that another world war would
shut down industrial and arms imports all brought military elites to see
state-led production as attractive (Hilton 1982, 643–44, 657–60).
Yet distinctive in Brazil were the civilian-military linkages the military itself was to forge. First among these was the Estado Novo itself—
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the authoritarian statemaking project of Getúlio Vargas. As historian
Frank McCann has found in a close reading of archival material surrounding the 1937 coup that inaugurated the Estado Novo, the army’s
top leaders, “Góes and Dutra were to give Vargas internal peace and
security, and he would get them the arms and the modern industries
that would support continued military development” (McCann 2006,
120). Thus military strategic prerogatives were the nucleus of the Estado
Novo, which created the institutional infrastructure that enabled Brazil’s
industrial development over the next decades.
The military now played a direct role in the creation of new laws
and state agencies intended to “nationalize” Brazilian production. Officer-engineers already held seats alongside private sector representatives
on policymaking councils addressing industrial development and foreign trade, but now military plans for steel and petroleum industries
could be fast-tracked. As in Argentina, military engineers took a leading
role. For instance, Coronel Edmundo de Macedo Soares, the military’s
leading “steel technocrat,” led negotiations that resulted in U.S. funding
and construction of the Volta Redonda steelworks—majority stateowned and wholly Brazilian, as military leaders had wanted. Macedo
Soares and other military engineers would hold its top management
positions for decades (Baer 1969, 78), emphasizing transparency and
close ties to private shareholders, as was to be typical in Brazil’s mixed
enterprises (Wirth 1970, 126–27).
Military-civilian industrial collaboration also involved ensuring that
state assistance went to key private firms that contributed to defense production, as early as the 1940s and even in hard economic times (Hilton
1982, 671–72). Yet Brazil’s military industrializers consciously fostered
close ties with private firms also to promote those that could compete
internationally and create linkages among national producers. An important means to achieve this was military education of civilian elites in
strategic thinking and technical know-how. Military training programs in
strategic studies, science, and engineering were open to civilians as early
as the 1940s. By 1966, more than half of the graduates of the Escola
Superior de Guerra, the highest academy for all the services, were civilian, educated in the strategic culture of the national security doctrine,
which identified national development with security (Stepan 1973, 54).
The result was a broad, ESG-indoctrinated elite network of state
bureaucrats, diplomats, and civilian industrialists (Payne 1994, 40). Similarly, military technical programs open to civilians contributed to the
development of an indigenous technological base while also giving the
military effective leverage over domestic private sector partners (Gouvea
Neto 1991, 85). As late as the 1970s, a remarkable 80 percent of the
graduates of the air force’s sophisticated engineering college, the Instituto Tecnológico de Aeronáutica (ITA), were civilians (Conca 1997, 41).
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In the era of military rule (1964–85), these military-sponsored elite
networks were enlisted in the expansion of the defense-industrial complex. The army was instrumental in turning a number of existing firms
into defense producers, such as Engesa, which became Brazil’s secondlargest defense firm (after Embraer) until bankruptcy in 1990 due to the
decline of its Middle East sales. Engesa made its mark assembling military trucks and armored vehicles that functioned well in Brazil’s rough
interior regions, making them also a prized export to other developing
countries. Its products were generally low tech but economically
appealing because they drew components from other domestic producers and had a positive impact on the expansion of related sectors.
In its start-up years, Engesa could rely on the inputs of engineering
and testing at army research facilities, and on government tax benefits
and major credits from state and private banks encouraged by the military regime (Conca 1997, 50–52; Lock 1986, 92). Differently organized
was the state-controlled enterprise Embraer, the flagship aeronautics
firm created in 1969. Yet also here the military guided the firm’s development. Despite 90 percent shareholding by private investors, the air
force retained control through designated seats on the board of directors. Underlying Embraer’s commercial success were steady government
contracts in the start-up years and important air force R&D inputs,
including ITA-trained civilian engineers who populated most of
Embraer’s management and executive positions (Conca 1997, 41).
By the end of military rule, the debt crisis, international pressure,
and the implosion of lucrative export markets marked the end of many
defense industries. Still, the military retained a remarkable degree of
control in the defense sector, particularly in oversight of R&D activities
and science and technology policy (Conca 1997, 114; Acuña and Smith
1995, 144). In contrast to the Argentine situation, there was little public
discussion of removing the military from the defense sector, largely
because the military managed the political transition and could benefit
from the absence of real elite resistance: the military-industrial developmentalist coalition had weakened, but it did not disappear, as in
Argentina.7

Nation Builders in Cuba
On a very different path, Cuba’s Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR)
have often played an important supporting role in building the socialist
economic order at the behest of the Communist Party leadership. The
successor to the rebel army led by Che Guevara and the Castro brothers, the FAR was a core element in the state-party–military coalition that
came to constitute the regime. In the early years of the revolution, the
FAR was arguably the only reliable institution in terms of organization,
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loyalty, and prestige for political leaders to enlist in economic development projects (Klepak 2005, 76).
FAR officers frequently assumed administrative posts to execute
economic reform, manage agricultural or industrial enterprises, or
simply help bring in the annual harvest. Yet the military’s deepest
impact on the economy came with the demise of the Cold War and
decades of Soviet economic support. With a 35 to 50 percent contraction in the economy between 1989 and 1993, and real problems of
widespread food scarcity and hunger, the very fabric of Cuban society
and the future of the socialist regime were at stake. Providing “food and
welfare” instead of violence as the means to ensure social unity was the
clear preference of the FAR’s longtime commander-in-chief, Raúl Castro
(Amuchástegui 1999, 113). It had become Cuba’s overwhelming strategic priority.
In response to the challenge, state leaders enlisted the military to
reorganize and revitalize state-owned enterprises in key economic sectors. Already in the 1980s, Raúl Castro had instituted training expeditions
for FAR officers to study business administration in Europe, with the
goal of enhancing efficiency and flexibility in Cuba’s state-owned enterprises. The resulting management model, perfeccionamiento empresarial, was tested at the Unión de Industrias Militares (UIM), the military’s
industrial conglomerate, where officers had for decades been cutting
their administrative teeth.8
Designed originally to repair military hardware and supply spare
parts and light arms, the UIM comprises 12 industries and more than 200
factories and companies. By the mid-1990s, the adoption of the new
model had made most of the UIM’s operations efficient and profitable
(Mora 2004, 11). Producing for both its own needs and civilian consumption, about 30 percent of the UIM’s output was serving civilian
industry and consumers, including mechanical parts and repairs necessary for productivity across the economy (Klepak 2005, 80–81). It was
also politically useful, in terms of encouraging political allegiance and
cohesion, that UIM profits could be applied to improve living standards,
like housing for thousands of its employees (Mora 2004, 11).
A more recent creation is Gaviota Enterprises, a set of nondefense
businesses that are state-owned and military-administered, generally led
by officers with a solid track record in business management and planning. Gaviota’s longtime director is General Luis Pérez Róspide, whose
background includes extensive experience running the dependable
UIM. Gaviota comprises businesses centered on Cuba’s $2 billion annual
tourism industry, including hotels, a domestic airline, nightclubs, shopping centers, marinas, and restaurants (Klepak 2005, 83). Gaviota
employs about 25 percent of the military’s troops and helps to provide
about 30 percent of the military’s budget (Mora 2004, 11).
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Gaviota is the regime’s star performer in securing state resources
through the marketplace. The military is also involved in other activities
that generate hard currency for the island, including running the country’s hard currency stores. For many foreign investors conducting joint
ventures in Cuba, military officers are the “point people.”
Despite its pervasive role in Cuba’s current economy, however, the
military has never taken economic initiatives without approval from the
political leadership. It is the regime’s most loyal supporter, and remains
part of a broader coalition dominated by a civilian political leadership
that has strategically deployed the military as an effective state asset for
reviving socialism. FAR officers have a reputation for diligence and
modesty. Corruption is remarkably low.9 The military’s “clean” history—
absent the overt political intervention that was once a regular part of
military behavior in much of the region, and absent a record of human
rights violations—gives it domestic credence as an agent of the state.
Since the 1990s, military officers have been a frequent source of economic planning advice for the regime in its efforts to renew its political
and economic viability. They head key government ministries, such as
sugar, communications, fisheries, and the merchant marine, and manage
government agencies and banks (Klepak 2005, 85–86).
It is therefore no stretch to attribute Cuba’s weathering of the
post–Cold War 1990s to innovations of FAR-run enterprises that have
politically legitimated greater economic openness in the economy without “sacrificing” the regime’s ideology. These contributions have
enhanced the military’s political and social standing and have given it a
stake in the gradual evolution of the system (Mora 2004, 11). While it
remains extremely difficult to determine actual numbers for revenues or
productivity in the absence of a transparent auditing system, Raúl
Castro’s rise to power means that the military entrepreneurship roles he
recommended back in the 1980s are virtually assured to continue, not
least because the alternative option of preventing social unrest with military violence has been unacceptable.10

Nation Builders in Ecuador
In Ecuador it was the military itself that initiated nation-building entrepreneurship in a social and political environment very different from
1990s Cuba. Ecuador’s military had a history of promoting antioligarchic,
proreform policies in each of its previous interventions. In the July Revolution of 1925, junior officers sought to build state institutions as a bulwark against the economic influence of the country’s powerful banking
class, creating the Banco Central; in the 1930s, the next military intervention brought the legalization of trade unions, state regulation of foreign investments, and the end of prohibitions on leftist parties. The mil-
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itary government of 1963–66 pursued agrarian reform and industrial
development (Conaghan 1988, 78). Yet it was the military government
of 1972–76, led by General Guillermo Rodríguez Lara, that established
the military’s lasting role in the economy. A strong developmentalist faction had emerged in the military during the 1960s, which considered the
military an essential protagonist in the economic development that was
necessary for political stability and national security. This ideological
consolidation within the military laid the groundwork for strategically
prioritizing economic and social development.11
The watershed discovery of petroleum in 1967 constituted the critical juncture that created a historic opportunity to transform the economy from its traditional agro-export enclave structure to a more diversified, industrialized one. Through state-led development, the 1972
regime sought to transform the economy to halt the damaging corruption of the national oligarchy and the profitable concessions they had
made to foreign corporations in anticipation of the oil boom (Conaghan
1988, 79). What military leaders lacked in practical economic planning
skills they made up for by relying on the expertise of the growing class
of Ecuadorian technocrats, trained in the development models of the
U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America (García Gallegos 2009).
Therefore the regime promptly introduced an economic plan based
on the dual pillars of a major state-led expansion of domestic consumer
industries, and an agrarian reform to promote both greater social equity
and a consumer market necessary for industrialization. Reforms were
financed through state control of petroleum refining, which also funded
new state enterprises in a range of industrial and consumer industries.
The industrial-consumer balance was mirrored in the industries the military itself came to control through the Dirección de Industrias de
Ejército (DINE).
Created in 1973, DINE became a holding company for what grew
to more than two dozen army-managed enterprises, producing everything from explosives and steel to bananas and real estate. In addition,
the navy created its own commercial fleet the same year, and the air
force expanded its existing commercial airline. It is significant that the
military developed enterprises in precisely the sectors that private sector
elites had targeted for their own involvement (e.g., industries favorable
for development under the Andean Pact, a trade agreement signed in
1969) (Conaghan 1988, 87).
Conaghan describes these military enterprises as the regime’s “most
threatening organizational innovations” to the private sector, because they
“appeared to preempt private-sector initiatives” (86). Until this point, the
military had maintained only modest enterprises dedicated to supplying
troops with basic necessities like food, uniforms, and light manufactured
goods, generally directed by unit commanders (García Gallegos 2009).
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As a result, the Ecuadorian business community began a strident
campaign against the military’s statism, which became so powerful that
the regime’s planners began to cede ground. Ultimately, the Rodríguez
Lara reformists failed politically—they could not construct the multiclass
coalition (including the popular sector and a modernizing bourgeoisie,
which never materialized) that could have resisted the powerful conservative classes and their still-present allies in some military factions. In
1975, those elements rallied in a countercoup, ousting Rodríguez Lara
and ending the reform era.
But although sweeping, military-led reformism disappeared, the
military’s influence in the economy did not. In the transition to democracy in 1979, the military secured lasting prerogatives, including representation in key administrative and advisory positions in the state, petroleum royalties dedicated to the defense budget, and the array of
enterprises developed in the 1970s, which today are valued at an
impressive $100 million. Moreover, mirroring the extension of the military’s political influence in the 1990s, the constitutionally enshrined
scope of its role in the economy, first established in 1967, has expanded
with each new constitution (1996 and 1998). Only the most recent constitution, promulgated under the reformist government of Rafael Correa
in 2008, legally restricts the military to economic activities related to
national defense. Still, the required divestiture of many of the military’s
holdings has proceeded slowly. A prolonged investigative auditing
process still leaves the complex conglomerate DINE with several companies bearing no defense rationale.12
Current efforts to reduce the military’s holdings are counteracted by
other government decisions that keep the military involved in the economy. On the one hand, the Correa government has sought to establish
institutionalized civilian control of the military, promoting legislation
that will audit military holdings through the defense ministry and incorporate them formally into the defense budget. On the other hand,
Correa has encouraged the military’s participation in management tasks,
arguably to serve national security interests; for instance, appointing
senior navy officers to run state-owned Petroecuador as a way to root
out corruption there. The current state of incomplete reform reflects
both the general challenge of building a legal-rational state and the
tenacity of the military in a situation in which, as civilian defense minister Javier Ponce describes it, “the problem of military sovereignty is at
stake” (El Universo 2009).
Ecuador’s military was able to establish its economic holdings with
substantial autonomy, thanks to a historically dysfunctional civilian
political elite and weak state institutions. It has maintained its businesses
virtually unchecked, even as institutional self-interest has replaced the
progressive ideology that originally legitimated their creation. The
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resentment and competition in economic visions held, on the one hand,
by a statist military and on the other by a fiercely pro–free enterprise
business sector are nothing new—they date back at least to 1925. What
is new in the last decades is the military’s use of its economic holdings
for development projects in indigenous communities. The unprecedented mobilization of these communities challenges both national
unity and the military’s arbiter role, as shown in the pivotal role of
indigenous groups in the coup of 1999—the military high command
eventually got the upper hand. The mobilization also serves to legitimate the military’s traditional national development concerns. Thus the
agro-businesses of DINE have been enlisted to produce for community
development projects in the Amazon interior (García Gallegos 2009). In
short, the military may yet find the popular support it would need to
relegitimate its parochial interests as national ones.

CONCLUSIONS
The diverse paths taken by Latin America’s military entrepreneurs are a
reminder that not all trajectories lead to the same place. Several important challenges that military entrepreneurship poses for the construction
of democratic civilian control of the armed forces were discussed in this
article; this section highlights issues specific to contemporary industrializers and nation builders and identifies conclusions that follow from this
study for policies to enhance democratic civilian control.

Industrializers Under Democratic Control
The era of military industrializers appears to be over. In general, this
path of entrepreneurship was blocked by the liberal economic reforms
of the 1990s, which profoundly reduced the role of the state in the economy and compelled greater efficiencies by opening domestic markets to
international competition. Moreover, the resolution of historical rivalries
and the advent of increased economic and political cooperation among
the countries of the Southern Cone and Brazil have eliminated the
mutual mistrust and strategic competition that drove their defense policies for much of the twentieth century. As a result, traditional statistnationalist coalitions that military industrializers once championed dissolved and have not reappeared.
In the 2000s, a trend has appeared in Argentina and Brazil to revive
defense industrial production, but now it is civilian leaders who are setting the terms for such projects (in Argentina) or who are aligned in
their strategic outlook with mainstream elements in the military (in
Brazil). Following Argentina’s major turn away from its industrializer
past, recent Peronist governments have directed the country on a more
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statist economic path since the financial crisis of 2001. There is renewed
official interest in charging the Defense Ministry with the task of “deepening and strengthening the development of industrial production,” as
the 2009 National Defense Policy Directive notes (Argentina, Ministry of
Defense 2009).
The statist turn has produced some important reversals of the privatization of defense industries that took place in the 1990s, notably
shipbuilding and ship repair, and aircraft production at the renationalized Córdoba facility. Governing leaders see in these facilities the potential for a targeted industrial revival that can stimulate other industries
and commercial exports. At this point, much is planned that has yet to
be realized, including a deal worth $500 million to build vessels for
Venezuela’s state oil corporation, joint production of naval ships with
Chile, an Embraer subsidiary at Córdoba to produce Brazilian-designed
aircraft with Argentine labor, and shipbuilding and repair for Brazil’s
expanding oil industry.
Yet the new state support of the defense sector is not a revival of
past practices. Though state-owned, the defense sector enterprises
remain modest and are accountable to the civilian-run Defense Ministry,
not to the military services. Indeed, the official rationale for the state’s
defense sector promotion is to reposition these enterprises to compete
internationally: national economic growth, rather than revival of defense
production for the military’s own use, is the primary goal.
In Brazil, there is more continuity—in thinking if not in organizational structure—regarding the continued influence of the military in the
national strategic culture. The military’s formal involvement is now limited to its research facilities and the state-owned military firms like
IMBEL, where active-duty officers participate as directors but in the
minority alongside civilian counterparts. Yet the military continues to
play an influential role in developing research and technology, in cooperation with private sector firms; for instance, for the country’s air
defense radar system. The military services played an important consultative role in the development of the National Defense Strategy issued
by the Defense Ministry in 2008. The strategy sets broad parameters for
restructuring the military and the national defense industry with a view
to 2030 (Brazil, Ministry of Defense 2008). It maintains long-held linkages between industry and economic development for national security,
emphasizing in particular the need for acquiring sensitive technologies
(e.g., nuclear, cybernetic); and it envisions support for defense production through cooperation with other South American producers. Coming
on the heels of the discovery of major offshore oil reserves, the 2008
Strategy is part of a larger vision that links contemporary civilian and
military elites in promoting long-held foreign policy goals updated for
the twenty-first century (Bitencourt and Costa Vaz 2009).
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Yet even with much military input, civilians have gained the upper
hand in key defense-planning decisions; for instance, overriding the air
force’s preferences in a major fighter jet acquisition because the French
manufacturer that the civilians preferred offered more attractive technology transfers and therefore greater technological autonomy (O Globo
2010). It seems that Brazil’s civilian elites are now more determined
champions of defense autonomy than ever before, a clear legacy of the
country’s midcentury military industrializers.
For the countries of the Southern Cone and Brazil, the current
expansion of the defense sector (still modest by global standards) has
important foreign policy goals. Joint design and production agreements
among these countries offer ways to reduce production costs, to share
technologies, and to cement diplomatic initiatives like military-to-military confidence building and regional cooperation on defense production. Although several South American countries (Chile, Ecuador, Peru,
Venezuela) have made arms acquisitions, these do not come close to the
scale of the defense production goals once pursued by the military
industrializers of earlier decades.
What appears to be developing is a “pacific community,” not across
South America but in a subregion of it, encompassing the more stable
democracies of the Southern Cone and Brazil, where militaries will still
play a role in industrial production but under civilian direction, and
where defense production is likely to become so interdependent that
the unexpected, beneficial legacy of midcentury military industrializers
is actually cooperation instead of conflict. Not least, these conditions—
increased political stability, economic productivity, and militaries oriented toward confidence building and joint cooperation with neighbors—are likely to enhance the attractiveness of democratic civilian
control for both political elites and the military.

Nation Builders with Potential Political Influence
In comparison, military nation building appears to be on the rise. In
addition to the Correa-era dynamics discussed in the Ecuadorian case,
military nation building is currently being encouraged by elected political leaders elsewhere. In Bolivia, Evo Morales has recently expanded
the role of the military in social development and public service provision. As part of a larger project to restore the state to a leadership role
in the postneoliberal economy, he has revived the armed forces’ Corporation for National Development (Cofadena), ending decades of
neoliberal government neglect of the military’s formal development
arm. Created in 1972 as a conglomerate of military-run enterprises
intended to promote national economic development, Cofadena will
once more coordinate enterprises “for the people”—assembling tractors,
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drilling wells, and participating in the lucrative processing of lithium
(ABI 2010).
A more haphazard project is underway in Venezuela, where Hugo
Chávez has occasionally relied on the military to “step into” management and security positions in key sectors like petroleum; for instance,
during the 2002 PDVSA strike. Though the Bolivian and Venezuelan
cases differ in several important ways, both reflect the important potential of the military to assume a prominent role as development brokers,
linking the state and previously marginalized social groups and thereby
strengthening the appeal of political leaders’ national projects.
What is worrisome is the political clout this path can yield for the
military in a democratic context. The military’s economic activities generally enhance its resource base, promoting greater autonomy from official budgetary controls, but it is the social support activities that can
generate for the military important popular legitimacy. As a result,
nation builders are better placed than industrializers to establish greater
de facto autonomy from civilian control. In general, this situation undermines the crucial development of oversight institutions like effective
defense ministries, unless political elites redouble efforts to strengthen
such democratic institutional controls.

Policy Implications
Regarding the strengthening of democratic civilian control of the military, this study suggests three conclusions. First, the most opportune
moments to restructure military economic involvement appear during
periods of political, and especially economic change. Military entrepreneurship generally has tended to emerge and recede in such periods,
which present a window of opportunity for both domestic and external
actors to influence future outcomes. While such global transformative
moments are rare and often difficult to manage, national-level transformations also merit attention, particularly if they reflect weakening
domestic support for military entrepreneurship.
External actors (international organizations, foreign governments)
may be particularly well placed to leverage such opportunities. The
restoration of diplomatic ties and economic aid for post-coup Honduras
was such an opportunity to press new political leaders on reforms to
reduce the military’s pension-investment fiefdom. Yet instead, the
opportunity appears to have been lost: in early 2010, the new government retired the general who carried out the coup at the behest of political opponents of the Zelaya government, then gave him the golden
parachute of directing Hondutel, the state communications company—
effectively returning it to the hands of the military that had run it in past
decades.

MANI: MILITARY ENTREPRENEURS

49

The existence of domestic allies for the military’s entrepreneurship
activities is an important influence on the political viability of the military’s economic project, but civil society can also be a linchpin for promoting reform. Military entrepreneurship can be particularly durable
when national political and economic elites are either in agreement with
it or too weak and divided to curtail it. In such conditions, promoting
both democratic political capacity and the will to institute oversight of
military economic activities is both important and challenging. Here,
civil society can play a potentially important role as a counterweight to
the military-political-economic elite nexus: where domestic opportunities for civil society groups are limited, they can leverage their influence
through association with external actors, reversing the initiative just discussed above (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Moreover, enhancing the capacity of state agencies to regulate economic activity and promote greater
transparency can help to inform and potentially mobilize civil society to
demand greater accountability from military and political elites, reinforcing and potentially locking in reforms.
The constructive or destructive impact of military entrepreneurship
is closely tied to the existence of democratic civilian control. It is important to acknowledge that military entrepreneurship is not an absolutely
negative development. In some forms, it has helped move countries
toward economic development that was unlikely to occur otherwise at
the time. However, it should be eliminated in the initial process of
democratization when democratic authority over the military is generally most fragile.
Military entrepreneurship is likely to be most constructive once the
armed forces are clearly accountable to a democratic leadership that can
monitor and incentivize its activities; it is least beneficial to the public
interest when the military is strongly autonomous or beholden to powerful private interests. If strengthening democracy is a goal, then military entrepreneurship is appropriate only when democratic civilian control is firmly in place. Even so, under these conditions, political leaders
must be resolute in maintaining their surveillance of the military’s economic activities, and civil society must be resolute in overseeing both
the politicians and the soldiers. Otherwise the detrimental forms of
autonomy, privilege, and power that can accompany military entrepreneurship are likely to reappear.
Ultimately, to assess the implications of military entrepreneurship,
we should base the analysis on a careful examination of the factors in
the military that motivated its economic activities, but we should also
pay close attention to the societal and political dynamics that enabled it.
Implementing effective policy responses to diminish the negative consequences of military entrepreneurship may prove difficult to achieve
without firm and consistent pressure. The best remedies—democrati-
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cally accountable political leaders, an effective and autonomous state
bureaucracy, and the reduction of social and economic problems that
historically have enabled the military’s role in the economy—are rarely
created in the short term.

NOTES
I thank Sam Fitch and Maiah Jaskoski, as well as the LAPS editor and five
anonymous reviewers, for their valuable comments and insights.
1. Under democratic civilian control, the armed forces are constitutionally
accountable to a democratically elected legislature and executive, which set
legal guidelines for their conduct and oversee such conduct through an institutional framework (e.g., a civilian-led defense ministry). Civilian authorities have
control over defense budgets and defense policy, and have oversight of the military’s professional training, education, promotion policies, and military doctrine. See Fitch 1998, 172; Diamint 1999, 29–30.
2. Military entrepreneurship is generally licit, though not necessarily transparent or just. By contrast, individual military officers might engage in illegal
economic activities, and militaries might even be pervasively corrupt, but this
does not constitute military entrepreneurship as defined here.
3. Research in defense economics has attended more persistently to such
issues. There is also a rich cross-regional literature on defense industries that
includes Latin American cases, including Brzoska and Ohlson 1986; Brauer and
Dunne 2004.
4. Exceptions include Acuña and Smith 1995, comparing Southern Cone
cases; Brenes and Casas 1998, comparing Central American cases; and several
newer studies that make cross-regional comparisons (Brömelhörster and Paes
2004; Mani 2007).
5. Most of these industrial advocates were army engineers who had trained
in specialties like metallurgy and aviation at European engineering schools, of
which none existed in Argentina at the time. They included Generals Enrique
Mosconi and Alonso Baldrich in petroleum, Major Francisco de Arteaga and
Brigadier Juan Ignacio San Martín in aviation, General (and President) Agustín
P. Justo sponsoring the national highway system, General Manuel Savio promoting steel and defense industries and founding the military’s technical academy, and General Juan Pistarini, who became Juan Perón’s public works minister and constructed the country’s first international airport in 1949, Latin
America’s largest at the time.
6. See, e.g., conclusions in Millán (1986, 50) and Acuña and Smith (1995, 135).
7. Stepan (1985, 335) notes that industrialists’ discontent at the end of the
regime was with increasing state regulation, not with the developmentalist
model the military had pursued.
8. For a discussion and useful bibliography on the “business perfection”
model, see Marquetti Nodarse 2003.
9. Klepak (2005, 85) notes that FAR officers involved in Gaviota, and particularly in the hard currency stores, can secure favorable access to exceptional
goods like refrigerators and televisions, which they can purchase with Cuban
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pesos rather than U.S. dollars. Perks like these are legitimate, however, and corruption at an egregious level appears uncommon. However, see Mora (2004, 14)
for references that would dispute the claim.
10. For discussion of the internal debates on the repression option, see
Amuchástegui 1999, 113; Klepak 2005, 56–58.
11. It was also aided by remarkably good relations between Ecuador and
its archrival, Peru, where an ideologically kindred reformist military regime took
power in 1968; the late 1960s through 1976 marked a period of détente based
on diplomacy and increased trade relations (Mares 2001, 166).
12. The nine DINE-controlled companies remain a diverse collection,
including steel, clothing and military uniforms, industrial explosives, firearms,
electrical energy, private security, real estate, banana farms, and ranching. DINE
also has minority participation in six other enterprises of a similarly broad
nature. See DINE n.d.
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